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Scientific Method and Juridical
Accountability in Mario Calderoni’s
Pragmatism
Rosa M. Calcaterra
1 Calderoni’s pragmatism is characterized by a polemical stance towards some important
William James’s theses. This controversy was one with his philosophical choice in favor of
Peirce’s pragmatism. We could define this choice as ethically founded, that is, as linked to
the typically Peircean attribution of a strong ethical value to the scientific-experimental
method. 
2 The ethical  choice in favor of  Peirce’s pragmatism seems to be confirmed as long as
Calderoni identifies a third form of pragmatism, in addition to the Peircean and Jamesian
versions. In the two writings published at a short distance on “Leonardo” – i.e Le varietà
del  pragmatismo  (November  1904)  and  Variazioni  sul  pragmatismo (February  1905)  –
Calderoni defines three forms of  pragmatism: 1)  the “critical” pragmatism, which,  in
harmony with Peirce’s pragmatic maxim, aims at eliminating as unsubstantiated issues all
those philosophical (and non-philosophical) questions that do not refer to “actual or even
simply possible expectations of ours”; 2) the pragmatism of “the will to believe,” which
temporarily or definitively refrains from pronouncing itself on the question of the truth
or  falsity  of  beliefs  (with  clear  reference  to  the  James-Schiller-Prezzolini  trend  of
thought); 3) “a third variety […] which recognizes the great role played by active and
voluntary  transactions  in  the  progress  of  our  knowledge,  which  draws  different
methodological consequences from it, relating to the sphere of definitions, hypotheses
and experiments.” This third form is clearly inspired by the idea of pragmatism as a
philosophical ratification of the experimental scientific method. It recognizes an ethical
quality also in the pragmatism of the “willingness to believe,” since this form is implicitly
close to  the criterion of  the voluntary construction of  experimental  hypotheses  that
contribute  to  modify  –  positively  or  negatively  –  our  beliefs.  However,  Calderoni’s
penchant for positivistic trust in scientific knowledge pushes him towards an ethic based
on clarity, confrontation with facts and, especially, on the conception of experience as an
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“uncomfortable  and severe teacher.”  According to  Calderoni,  this  concept  essentially
characterizes Peirce’s pragmatism and his divergence from James. 
3 The distinction between a “respectable” pragmatism and a non-Peircean “degenerate”
pragmatism –  the  pragmatism of  James  and  the  Oxfordian  Ferdinand  Canning  Scott
Schiller – has produced an interpretative koiné which is deeply rooted in the Italian
philosophical culture. One fact contributed to this phenomenon. Calderoni’s controversy
with James was connected with the heated discussions among the young intellectuals who
created the Florentine magazine “Il Leonardo.” These discussions testify the widening
gap between two different ways of welcoming pragmatism, namely that of Vailati and
Calderoni  on  the  one  hand,  and  that  of  Prezzolini  and  Papini  on  the other.  These
differences would soon have led to the conclusion of the story of “Il  Leonardo.” It is
interesting  to  note  that  the  two  forms  of  reception  of  pragmatism  were  linked  to
conflicting  political  attitudes:  the  constant  socialist  orientation  of  the  “logical
pragmatists” and – after the conclusion of the Leonardo – the sympathies for fascism
expressed by Papini and Prezzolini, who, moreover, later distanced themselves from it. In
this  regard,  Vincent  Colapietro noted the contrast  between “the exuberant  denial  of
human limits” by Prezzolini and “the humble recognition of them” by Calderoni, and
pointed to “the denial of the existence of any limits to human will” as an element that
predisposed Prezzolini and Papini towards fascism. 
4 Supposing hypothetically that these expressions partly reflect the thoughts of the so-
called “magic” pragmatists Papini and Prezzolini, it would certainly be easy to prove how
little  they are  compatible  with James’s  thinking.  However,  the  contrast  between the
pragmatism of Peirce and James as a “degenerate” form of the peircean version is still
quite lively on the international philosophical scene. In various contexts I have refuted
this  opposition,  trying  to  show affinities  rather  than  the  alleged  radical  differences
between Peirce’s pragmatist trend and that of James, Mead, Dewey and their more recent
epigones.
5 To this end, it is worth noting an important point of convergence between Peirce and
James, namely their common intention to make room for the core criteria of scientific
methodology: Experimentalism, fallibility and the principle of “sociality.” The allegedly
individualist James did not fail to stress these points in The Meaning of Truth, the text in
which he tried to respond to the various misunderstandings of his own philosophy, a text
that, perhaps not by chance, has been ignored for a long time especially in Europe.1 
6 However,  Calderoni  identified  a  firm point  of  divergence  between  Peirce  and  James
precisely in their respective attitudes of “respect” and “suspicion” towards the scientific
method. Calderoni would probably have reviewed some of his views on James, had he
been able to have a deeper understanding of his work. Let us consider the following
passage of the conference “Pragmatism and Humanism,” in which James regretted the
real misunderstandings caused by the title he had chosen for his most famous work: “I
once wrote an essay on our right to believe, which I unluckily called the Will to Believe.
All  the  critics,  neglecting  the  essay,  pounced  upon  the  title.  Psychologically  it  was
impossible, morally it was iniquitous. The ‘will to deceive,’ the ‘will to make believe,’ were
wittily proposed as substitutes for it.”2
7 Leaving these reflections in the background, I would now like to try to look a little more
closely at the reasons for appreciating the pragmatism of Peirce that Calderoni offers us
and the applications he proposes. As I mentioned earlier, Calderoni shares the ethical
quality of  Peirce’s  pragmatism, for example his  emphasis  on the values of  clarity,  of
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confrontation with facts and, especially, of the conception of experience as “boaring but
indispensable” (Calderoni 2007: 70). Starting from these criteria, which are both ethical
and epistemological values, he introduces his most original arguments. First of all, the
understanding of the meaning of terms and concepts by means of examples rather than
definitions, in relation to their use and “grammatical” relationships – as Wittgenstein will
later  say –  with other terms or  concepts  –  in short,  in relation to a  given semantic
context. 
8 On this issue, introduced in the review of Giorgio Del Vecchio’s book “The philosophical
assumptions of the notion of law” (1905),3 Giovanni Tuzet wrote interesting and precise
pages.4 Tuzet clearly highlighted the points of difficulty that emerge when one tries to
explain the meaning of legal and moral concepts and their normative character through
the  application  of  Pierce’s  maximum  pragmatic  approach,  which  as  we  have  seen
Calderoni  interprets  in  terms of  predicting the probable  consequences  of  an idea or
belief.  It  is  appropriate,  however,  to  take  up here  a  few passages  of  the  text  under
discussion: 
The need for a real “definition” is not always felt:  it  is sufficient, sometimes, to
make a word usable,  to indicate a number of examples chosen conveniently,  by
trusting in a vague similarity that we perceive, or we suppose to exist among the
examples  themselves,  without  however  indicating  in  what  this  resemblance
consists […] The need of knowing the meaning of a word does not arise therefore as
long as there is consensus in the use of it.  In fact,  it  is felt strongly every time
dissent arises between those who have to apply it […] All sciences, all disciplines
have their “difficult cases,” which are unknown to the routiniers of the sciences
and  disciplines  themselves:  these  need  prompt  the  need  to  define  what  the
routiniers find evident, obvious, intuitive; in them lies in the fact, the “practical”
justification of every philosophy. Philosophy is born, therefore, from dissent and it
presupposes dissent.5
9 In addition to the questions related to the understanding of meaning, we find in these
passages  a  precise  definition  of  the  origin  and  task  of  philosophy,  understood  as  a
therapeutic  activity  that  aims  at  identifying  and  dissolve  the  “mental  cramps,”  the
“enchantments” produced by the use of language itself, as Wittgenstein later said. 
10 The comparison with Wittgenstein is particularly interesting if one considers Calderoni’s
reflections  on the distinction between voluntary and involuntary acts,  on which the
theme of individual responsibility – both moral and juridical – is based. The ethics of
clarity, inspired by Peirce’s pragmatic maxim, is expressed in the proposal to address the
question of the meaning of words or concepts through the production of examples and,
sometimes, the display of objective references of words. This same strategy must also be
adopted  when  we  try  to  clarify  issues  relating  to  the  concept  of  human  will.  It  is
necessary to start from the observation and description of the events of everyday life in
order to understand what expressions such as “voluntary” and “involuntary” mean, as
long as these expressions recur continuously and, above all, in a “spontaneous” way in
our ordinary practices. The distinction between voluntary and involuntary acts belongs
to our language as well as to our emotional attitudes. At the emotional level, it makes a
big  difference  if  we  judge  a  certain  event  as  the  result  of  a  voluntary  act  or  of  an
involuntary cause – e.g. natural causes or human actions which cannot be attributed to
the voluntariness of the subjects involved. There will be different emotional/affective
reactions to the same event, depending on their explanation in terms of voluntary cause,
or vice versa.
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11 On  the  other  hand,  according  to  Calderoni  a  key  role  is  played  by  the  clarity  and
obviousness through which the distinction between voluntary and involuntary presents
itself, both in relation to acts already carried out and those still to be carried out. It is
interesting to underline the theoretical question that emerges from these statements,
namely the intention to seek a way to eliminate the contrast between science and ethical
practice. On the one hand, this intention is in line with positivistic confidence in scientific
knowledge – in fact,  Calderoni stresses the need to bring ethical analysis back to the
criteria of the scientific knowledge and method; on the other hand, we can observe here
an anticipation of the typical tendency of the second twentieth century to go beyond a
fixed  point  of  logical  positivism,  namely  the  clear  distinction  between the  scientific
sphere and the practical sphere, and the certainty that these two domains are governed
by  completely  heterogeneous  criteria  –  respectively,  a  subjective-emotional  and  an
objective-rational one.
12 More specifically, Calderoni claims that the characteristic of voluntary action consists in
being “capable of being provoked or modified by the prediction of specific events, both
outside of us and within us.”6 A questionable clarification, since the range of possible
predictions is always related to a number of potentially indefinable factors. However,
Calderoni does not fail to pay attention to the distinction between “being able to predict”
and “knowing how to predict.” This distinction is clearly crucial for the attribution of
moral or legal responsibility for an act. Calderoni expresses a strong disappointment with
regard to the “Lombarans” who claim an equivalence between power and will, against
which – writes Calderoni – the common sense rebels.
13 For the purposes of comparison with Wittgenstein and the theorists of the action that
have followed his traces, Calderoni’s distinction between the explanation of the material
properties – e.g.  colours – and the explanation of whether or not human actions are
voluntary plays an interesting role. According to Calderoni, the explanation of material
properties  can  be  met  ostensively,  while  the  explanation  of  the  voluntariness  or
involuntary nature of human actions requires an ad hoc experimental procedure, suitable
to verify whether a certain act would have been repeated in any possible circumstance.
Calderoni  sets  a  difference  between  voluntariness  and  involuntary  acts,  which
corresponds to the difference between elasticity and plasticity of physical bodies. In this
way the possibility is ruled out that the voluntary act can consist only in the memory of
past experiences, since it is rather characterized by a cognitive component whose specific
nature  consists  in  being  a  conditional  prediction.  This  last  aspect  represents  the
constitutive trait of voluntariness and coincides with the meaning of human freedom.7
14 On this point, there is a divergence with Wittgenstein. With regard to the analysis of
intentional verbs – e.g. deciding, intending, wanting, saying, etc. – Wittgenstein refuses
the confusion caused by the continuous interference of physical language with all our
discourse  forms:  “All  our  ways  of  speaking  are  borrowed  from the  normal  physical
language and are not to be used in epistemology or phenomenology without putting the
subject to a wrong light.”8 The grammar of will has its own specific status, which has very
little  to  do  with  the  knowledge  of  any  past  experience  or  with  the  verifiability  or
falsifiability  of  asserts  in  which  terms  such  as  “volunteer”  or  “involuntary”  appear.
Rather, it is necessary to refer to the plan of practical reason, and to the subjectively
constituted normativity that characterizes its articulation and its possible developments.
A similar  argument  can be  found in  Calderoni,  if  we move on to  the  ground of  his
observations about legal or moral responsibility, a domain that is obviously close to that
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of voluntariness/liberality. In this context, normativity is defined as a social product, by
affirming the close link between the existence of rules of conduct and customs and the
very concept of responsibility. Calderoni affirms in short that the meaning of the term
responsibility alludes to certain “artificial” consequences – i.e. produced by society and
its history – which certain acts imply.9
15 It is not clear how the definition of normativity as a “social product” can be linked to a
conception  of  will  which  is  still  imbued  with  a  “factual”  human  ontology.  I  would
therefore like to focus on his clarification that “the norms of custom” imply “constant
ways of reacting to the actions of  others,”10 bearing in mind that Calderoni tends to
combine  a  pragmatic  approach  to  the  conceptual  network  of  notions  of  will,
responsibility and normality with a brentanian approach to the problem of explaining
human action.
16 As  we  know,  scholars  often  singled  out  into  Brentano’s  thought  an  “internalist/
mentalist” perspective that is not entirely consistent with Peirce’s pragmatism. And yet
Calderoni invites us to value Brentano’s theory of “mental facts,” according to which they
must be distinguished in representations or ideas and beliefs and judgments, defining the
latter  as  mental  facts  susceptible  to  truth  or  falsity,  precisely  because  they  imply
predictions or expectations:11
What distinguishes voluntary action from involuntary action is precisely this: that
voluntary  action  is  what  counts  among  its  causes  some  judgments,  some
predictions in general, and in particular predictions relating to the act itself that is
about to take place. Voluntary action is the kind of action that can be provoked or
modified by the prediction of specific events, both outside of us and within us, and
more particularly by the prediction of what would happen if the action were to be
carried out (the consequences, that is, of the action itself).12
17 Following Brentano, Calderoni maintains that beliefs or judgments are the phenomena
that cause the voluntary act. Here the distance from Wittgenstein is considerable. Within
the phenomenological framework inspired by Brentano, intentionality is understood as
the specific characteristic of  the mind, and as what defines the relationship between
states or mental processes and real facts, including those related to human action. On the
other  hand,  according  to  Wittgenstein  intentional  verbs  derive  their  meaning  from
certain relationships  “internal”  to  the language itself,  and not  from the relationship
between thought and reality to which Brentano sought, precisely, to link his notion of
intentionality.
18 In  Wittgenstein’s  Philosophical  Investigations,  this  anti-Brentano  position  takes  on  a
particularly interesting aspect in comparison with Calderoni. In a nutshell, Wittgenstein
understands voluntary action in connection with a specific context and language games.
The set of mutual expectations that are generated among speakers contributes to the
creation of this context and these games. Intentional verbs express attitudes that depend
on the agent and, at the same time, on the language game within which he acts. They
depend on contexts “which we govern” and which, precisely for this reason, differ from
linguistic  games  relating  to  physical  or  psychological  facts,  which  instead  happen
regardless of our will, i.e. “whether we want it or not.”13 Wittgenstein thus invites us to
recognize the strength and permeability of the normative dimension of human life. As
free persons, we are responsible for the standards that we ourselves build and which,
precisely  for  this  reason,  we  can  also  potentially  change.  While  Calderoni  tends  to
assimilate  human  freedom  to  the  logical  capacity  to  construct  predictions,  the
wittgensteinian  perspective  attributes  it  instead,  and  in  apparent  paradox,  to  the
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normativity interweaving human actions. The freer are these action, the more they are
normatively determined.14
19 Following Wittgenstein, Georg Henrik Von Wright elaborated a conception of free actions
that can supplement Calderoni’s observations on the relationship between freedom and
determinism. As Pastore observes, Calderoni frames the relationship between freedom
and determinism into a compatibilist vision that has an important predecessor in Hume:
“Will and choice are determined by our history, our experience, our circumstances, the
environmental and family influences that have formed us. Actions are determined by
human will, which, in turn, is determined by factors external to the agent.” (Pastore 2016:
379). In this same direction, Von Wright’s studies converge in his neo-wittgensteinian
theory of action, in particular in the notion of “action for reasons,” a concept he defines
as “twin” to the concept of free action.15 If the very concept of cause itself brings with it
the idea of the rigidity of the laws of nature, affirming the centrality of “reasons” means
understanding the exercise of the ability to reason as the domain of the meanings and of
the interpretations of terms or concepts that gradually intervene in the assessments of
our and others’ behaviours. This entails setting aside the idea according to which this
capacity implies a causal relationship with respect to action, thus providing an exact,
unambiguous logical explanation of the individual actions.
20 As we have seen, the term “cause” occupies a steady position in Calderoni’s notes on
human actions. On the other hand, it is likely that he would have subscribed to Von
Wright’s  assertion  that  the  concept  of  freedom  is  a  logical  presupposition  for  the
comprehension/explanation of all these phenomena, namely that the concepts used to
describe and explain human actions, such as motive, reason, choice, deliberation, etc., all
relate to the idea of “freedom.”16
21 Perhaps  a  logical-semantic  in-depth analysis  could help to  bring forward the ethical
quality  of  Calderoni’s  pragmatism that  I  mentioned  at  the  beginning  of  my  speech.
Moreover, it could also help to revisit the relationship between the normative level and
the descriptive level, which his writings propose as a philosophical theme of primary
importance. It seems therefore interesting to recall Wittgenstein’s uses the expression
“creative acts” to refer to what it is expressed by some intentional verbs and in particular
the verb “will,” just to underline that their normative status does not derive from past or
possible experiences.  In this way, I  believe there is an interesting turning point with
respect to the “logicist” rationalism that Calderoni has tried to defend contra James –
although Calderoni follows a theoretical approach that is far from being old-fashioned
and, in any case, invites him to retrieve the most original traits precisely in order to
revisit  the  concepts  of  rationality  and  human creativity.  But  then it  is  perhaps  not
entirely out of place to rethink also, without surrendering to irrationalist scepticism, to
the prophetic expression of his friend and contender Giuliano the Sofist: “the rational
animal will give way to the creative animal.”17
22 In 1924, concluding his introductory pages to the two volumes in which he had collected
the writings of Mario Calderoni, Giovanni Papini wrote: 
Someone, sooner or later, will pick up the broken threads, the unfinished walls, and
then, however absurd such a prophecy may seem today, Calderoni’s thought will
appear as one of the major contributions of Italian philosophy in the first decade of
this century.18
23 There is no doubt that the originality of this philosopher, his ability to develop arguments
and  philosophical  practices that  anticipated  important  lines  of  twentieth-century
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philosophy,  are  now  finally  recognized.  Therefore  I  believe  that  it  is  more  than
appropriate to accept the invitation of Papini to take up the “broken threads” of the short
yet  intense  philosophical  activity  of  Calderoni,  and  to  attempt  to  develop  further
intertwining and articulations.
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ABSTRACTS
The paper firstly reconstructs Mario Calderoni’s criticism of the Jamesian version of pragmatism,
which corresponds to his philosophical choice in favor of the ethical value assigned by Peirce to
the  scientific-experimental  method.  In  this  light,  I  propose  a  reading  of  some  Calderoni’s
arguments concerning the link between the construction of beliefs, practical norms and moral or
legal  responsibility,  trying  to  reassess  his  criticisms  of  James  and  then  his  conception  of
philosophy  as  a  practical  and  therapeutic  activity.  The  latter  will  be  discussed  considering
Wittgenstein’s analysis of intentional verbs and Calderoni’s approach to the issues of freedom, of
the definition of voluntary acts as well as of individual responsibility, both moral and legal. In
particular,  I  will  focus  on  the  paradigm  shift  suggested  by  Wittgenstein  with  regard  to  the
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